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Motivation
Recent monetary statistics provide evidence that euro zone banks have substantially increased their domestic marketable sovereign debt exposure. The accelerating public sector indebtedness might have significantly contributed to the growth of sovereign debt exposure across banks. Recent studies suggest that banks have changed their investment strategies following the global financial crisis. Yet, they leave aside the impact of banking sector regulation.
The demand for marketable sovereign debt might be strongly influenced by regulation, particularly the Basel II and Basel III framework. Banking sector regulation treats government debt denominated in domestic currency as "risk-free" and allows zero-risk weighting for them. It sets incentives for holding public debt rather than assets with non-zero risk weights. The global financial crisis revealed significant deficiencies of the existing regulatory framework. Thus, credit institutions needed to adopt a new framework and to meet stricter capital and additional liquidity requirements. The latter set further incentives for holding marketable sovereign debt. Some policy makers including Banque de France (Nouy 2012) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2013) have criticized the preferential treatment of sovereign debt within the Basel Accord.
Banks are important financiers of public households in the euro area holding 19% of total outstanding marketable public debt instruments. The relative share of domestic claims in the overall sovereign debt portfolio equals 71%. In Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, almost the entire public debt exposure of monetary financial institutions (MFI) is concentrated on the domestic public sector. Public interventions to support financial institutions increase the interdependence of public sector and financial industry. The links between banks and the public sector have been highlighted in recent research but literature on determinants of banks' sovereign debt exposure in terms of volume is particularly limited (Buch et al. (2013) ). Hildebrand et al. (2012) utilize unique micro-level data and examine the holdings of securities across all German banks. Their results suggest that banks have re-balanced their portfolios following the collapse of Lehman Brothers towards securities which are accepted by central banks as eligible collateral for their credit operations. Moreover, the results provide strong evidence that German banks have increased the share of domestic securities in their overall portfolios. Buch et al. (2013) build upon the same database and examine the determinants of sovereign debt holdings. They confirm the shift 2 towards domestic government securities and find that banks with weak capitalisation and banks with small depositor base have higher sovereign debt exposures.
Both existing literature and recent empirical evidence suggest a significant increase of domestic marketable securities within the overall sovereign debt portfolio of MFI across euro countries. Yet, to the authors' knowledge, neither the drivers of banks´ demand for sovereign debt nor the shift towards domestic claims on the public sector have been analysed so far. To bridge this gap, the focus of this paper will be the influence of banking sector regulation, particularly the Basel II and Basel III framework, on banks´ demand for sovereign debt. We examine the treatment of sovereign debt exposure within the Basel framework and measure its impact on the demand of MFI for marketable sovereign debt. Hildebrand et al. (2012) and Buch et al. (2013) focus on outstanding securities. This paper, in contrast, builds upon flows rather than stocks. Stocks remain relatively stable over time and reflect both past and current demand for marketable sovereign debt.
Changes in stocks are not only driven by the amount of financial transactions, i.e. they
are not always equal to flows, but also reflect reclassifications, exchange rate changes and other adjustments. In contrast, flows only include the amount of current financial transactions and exclude valuation effects. Hence, flows reveal more variation over time and provide a better measure of the MFI demand on marketable sovereign debt.
The analysis employs euro zone country level panel data and is done on a quarterly basis for the period between Q1 1999 and Q4 2013. Our results suggest that bank regulation has a significant positive impact on MFI demand for domestic government securities. The results are representative of the overall monetary union. They remain highly robust and significant after controlling for potential endogeneity.
The structure of our paper is as follows. This section is motivation. Section 2 highlights the treatment of public debt within the Basel framework. Section 3 explains empirical methodology and examines data. The results are summarized in section 4. A concluding section follows. Detailed descriptions of the data and data sources are provided in the appendix.
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The role of sovereign debt within the Basel framework
Sovereign debt plays a special role within the banking sector regulation. The Basel Accord (also known as Basel I, Basel II and Basel III) contains recommendations and rules for regulation, supervision and risk management in the banking sector. It is transposed into European Union (EU) law through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 1 and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the legal framework for banking sector regulation.
The treatment of sovereign debt within the Basel framework potentially influences the demand of MFI for marketable sovereign debt. The following sections 2.1 to 2.3 give a short description of those rules of Basel I, II, and III that particularly focus on investments in sovereign debt. The risk weight for claims on sovereigns was either 0% if they were OECD members or 100% otherwise. In addition, national policy makers were allowed to assign zero risk weight for claims on domestic sovereign debt denominated in local currency. The CAD allowed zero risk weighting for public debt of both domestic government and any EU member state government denominated in local currency.
Basel II: risk weights within the same asset class driven by the default probability
The risk weights under Basel I were equal for claims belonging to the same asset class, regardless of the actual creditworthiness of the debtor. This issue was addressed by regulators and resulted in the revision of the framework. The subsequent Basel II framework was initially published in June 2004 and was implemented in the EU by January 2007. It accounts for different default probabilities across borrowers belonging to the same asset class. In the context of Basel II, counterparty risk weights are driven both by the asset class and the default probability of individual borrowers. Riskier assets have higher risk weights and require a higher capital backing than safer assets in the same class.
Credit institutions are allowed to choose between the Standardized Approach (SA) and the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA) for estimating the default probabilities of their counterparties. The risk weights under the SA are based on credit ratings of accepted External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI). Usually, these are the three leading rating agencies FitchRatings, Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P), and, in addition, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS). External ratings are mapped to credit quality steps, a harmonized rating scale between 1 and 6 (see Table 2 ). High quality claims on sovereigns with an external credit rating between AAA and AA-have 0% risk weight (20% risk weight for A+ to A-). Usually, there is more than one external rating available from different ECAI. Where more than one external rating is available, the regulation refers to those two credit assessments which would yield the lowest risk weights and chooses the higher of the two. The risk weights under the IRBA are based on sophisticated quantitative techniques and usually exceed 0%, even for high quality sovereigns claims. However, they can yield minor risk weights for lower rating classes and ease the strain on regulatory capital. In general, credit institutions that choose the IRBA have to apply it continuously to their credit portfolio. Notwithstanding, they are allowed to use a permanent carve-out and apply the SA for their sovereign debt exposure.
The national policy makers' discretion regarding zero risk weighting for claims on domestic sovereign debt remained particularly unchanged within Basel II: the CRD still allowed 0% risk weight under the SA for public debt of EU member states denominated in domestic currency regardless the actual sovereign default probability.
Basel III: more stringent capital requirements and additional liquidity requirements
The global financial crisis revealed significant deficiencies of the regulatory framework.
Therefore, the framework has been revised in the aftermath to the crisis. Basel III was published in December 2010 and implemented in the EU gradually from January 2014, one year later than initially planned.
Basel III goes beyond the earlier framework and requires more stringent requirements for capital adequacy. It provides stricter rules on eligible regulatory capital and requires maintaining a higher CAR of at least 10.5%. National regulatory authorities are allowed to require an additional Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) of up to another 2.5%, depending on macroeconomic conditions. The new capital requirements will be introduced gradually between 2014 and 2019. The risk weights for large financial institutions were increased but the risk weights for sovereign debt remained unchanged.
From 2018 on, the Leverage Ratio (LR) will complement the CAR. The ratio is defined as core capital Tier 1 expressed as percentage of total bank assets and off-balance exposure. In contrast to CAR calculation, assets will be generally not risk-weighted. The ASF is the weighted book value of bank equity and liabilities. The weights vary between 100% for stable funding sources (mainly regulatory capital and liabilities with an effective maturity beyond one year) and 0% for unstable sources (including funding from central banks with residual maturity of less than six months). The RSF is the sum of bank assets and contingent liabilities. These are also assigned different weights between 0% for liquid assets (mainly cash and central bank reserves) and 100% for illiquid assets. The weights are 5% and 15% for level 1 and level 2 HQLA respectively with an effective maturity of at least one year. HQLA with an effective maturity below one year are assigned 100% weight. The treatment of HQLA for the NSFR calculation sets incentives for using liquid assets with more than one-year maturity rather than shortterm assets for meeting the LCR requirements. The NSFR is to be introduced in 2018.
Banks will be required to maintain a ratio of at least 100%.
Potentially false incentives arising from sovereign debt treatment within the Basel framework
Although various regulatory requirements were significantly increased, claims on the domestic public sector were granted special status within Basel I. This status remained unchanged in Basel II and has become even more important within the Basel III framework. Particularly before the euro debt crisis, public debt of EU member states denominated in local currency was widely regarded as "risk-free" by bank regulators.
However, the recent default of Greece illustrates that a sovereign default of a euro member state is a realistic scenario. Notwithstanding, the actual risk weight for claims on domestic sovereign debt is to a large extent based on national policy makers' discretion rather than affected by the sovereign default probability. In most cases, it is still treated as "risk-free".
Although larger banks tend to use the IRBA, a recent analysis of the European Banking
Authority (EBA 2013) shows that most large banks apply the carve-out and use the SA for their central government portfolios. In a sample of 35 large banks from 13 EU countries, 23 were applying the carve-out. As larger banks apply the carve-out and smaller banks tend to use the SA, we estimate that the SA is applied to most sovereign debt exposure of the banking sector within the euro area in terms of volume.
Stricter requirements for capital adequacy for the banking sector as well as higher risk weights for claims on non-sovereigns require stronger capitalization of credit institutions. Stronger capitalization as well as the newly introduced NSFR and LCR potentially improve the solvency of credit institutions. However, the regulation could also provide false incentives and create new risks. Relatively high risk weights for claims on non-sovereigns compared to claims on sovereigns combined with stricter rules on eligible regulatory capital and higher minimum CAR require either higher capitalization or lower risk profile for credit institutions.
The new LR sets the upper limit for overall bank exposure, and thus specifically offsets the unlimited demand for assets with zero risk weight. Notwithstanding, claims on governments receive preferential treatment that potentially affects the MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt. In times of deteriorating capital ratios, the regulatory environment incentivises banks either to build up assets or to shift their asset allocation from non-zero weighted claims towards assets with zero risk weight, particularly claims 8 on domestic general government. The new liquidity requirements force banks to hold more marketable sovereign debt with an effective maturity beyond a one-year horizon.
Although the CRR limits the risk exposure to a single counterparty, restrictions on large exposures do not apply for sovereign debt with 0% risk weight under SA. The regulatory incentives in conjunction with the missing restrictions on large exposures for sovereign debt could potentially result in higher risk concentration and make the banking sector more vulnerable towards domestic sovereign debt problems. The banking sector in Greece had to write down 29.9 bn euros on their domestic government securities portfolio between August 2011 and April 2012. Following the sovereign default, Greek domestic banks required a significant recapitalization.
Our hypothesis is that there is a significant relationship between banking sector regulation and MFI demand for sovereign debt investments. Public debt treatment within the Basel framework should have a strong impact on MFI demand for government obligations. Our paper examines the influence of Basel II and Basel III relative to the regulatory framework that was in effect before.
Data and definitions
The analysis employs country panel data for all euro member states and is done on a quarterly basis for the period between Q1 1999 and Q4 2013. 2 Those countries which have joined the monetary union after Q1 1999 have been considered following their entrance. All member states are exposed to the same banking supervision and regulatory environment. Thus, they are required to meet the same regulatory standards and are similarly exposed to both monetary policy and intervention of the ECB.
The following sections describe the data and introduce the variables. Section 3.1 examines the structure of public debt and MFI debt holdings across the sample countries. The descriptive analysis helps to identify an appropriate depending variable for measuring the MFI demand for domestic sovereign debt that is presented in section 3.2. The subsequent section 3.3 introduces potential demand determinants, including banking regulation and chosen control variables. In the following banks, credit institutions and MFI are used as synonyms. Detailed description of data and sources is provided in the appendix.
Descriptive statistics
In Europe, both public debt level and marketable sovereign debt exposure of MFI on domestic general government have significantly increased over the recent years. This section examines the structure of general government debt and sovereign debt portfolios across euro member states.
Public debt structure in the euro area
The absolute amount of public debt within the monetary union increased from 5,021
billion euros (73% of GDP) in Q1 1999 to 6.848 billion euros (79% of GDP) in Q3 2008 and peaked at 10,174 billion euros (119% of GDP) in Q4 2013. Table 4 Tables 5-8 (in the appendix) summarize the overall structure of public debt across euro member states in terms of issuer, currency, residual maturity and financial instrument.
Most public debt is issued by central governments. Except for Estonia and Germany, state and local government debt contribution is relatively low. General government debt is almost entirely denominated in domestic currency, which is euro. Three quarters of total government debt has residual maturity above one year. The public sector uses both marketable and non-marketable debt instruments to meet its financing needs. peaked at 1,313 billion euros in Q4 2013. In terms of total banks assets, the share increased from 3.8% to 5.6%. Table 10 (appendix) reviews the ratio of domestic sovereign debt holdings to total MFI assets across the member states. Their government bonds are held by both domestic and foreign banks. The overall market volume for these instruments is relatively small since the government has little debt outstanding. Therefore, domestic MFI tend to invest some of their funds into foreign government bonds. On the other hand, economies with high public debt-to-GDP ratios have higher default risk. Given the higher default risk, it becomes more difficult to find foreign MFI who buy these debt instruments. Foreign MFI exposure gradually declines with total public debt-to-GDP ratios. At the same time domestic MFI gradually increase their domestic marketable sovereign debt exposure and reduce their foreign sovereign bond exposure. Significant risk concentration potentially makes the banking sector highly vulnerable to domestic sovereign debt problems.
Dependent variable: MFI demand for domestic marketable sovereign debt instruments
As we have shown above, securities comprise both most public debt instruments and sovereign debt exposures of MFI in the euro area. This aggregate comes closest to the definition of HQLA within the Basel III framework. Thus, we examine the demand of MFI for marketable sovereign debt instruments. The analysis builds upon securities issued by domestic general government. The volume of securities is not distorted by emergency loans which were provided by the international community. Focusing on domestic debt allows a direct link between endogenous domestic factors and the dependent variable.
We build upon flows rather than stocks. The dependent variable is the amount of financial transactions of MFI with securities issued by the domestic general government (MFI_GGSec). It is expressed as percentage of the GDP for the relevant period. In thefollowing securities, marketable sovereign debt and bonds are used as synonyms. Next section introduces potential drivers of MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt.
Potential determinants of MFI demand for domestic marketable sovereign debt
Our ultimate goal is to measure the impact of the Basel framework on the MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt. Different effects going beyond banking sector regulation could also influence the MFI demand. Therefore, we add several control variables.
Potential drivers have been grouped into four categories: (1) primary market supply of marketable sovereign debt, (2) banking sector regulation, (3) banking sector asset allocation strategy and funding sources, and (4) policy makers' and public sector interventions.
Primary market supply
In order to meet their demand for marketable sovereign debt, MFI can use both the primary and the secondary markets. The net issue of general government securities drives the primary market (GGSec). We focus on the amount of financial transactions (flows) rather than on the outstanding amounts (stocks). The variable is expressed as percentage of the GDP for the relevant period.
The primary market supply should have a significant impact on the MFI demand. The secondary market, however, could be affected by numerous factors which are summarized below.
Banking sector regulation
We want to test whether banking sector regulation is one of the key drivers for MFI demand on marketable sovereign debt. We believe that the regulatory environment has a substantial positive impact on MFI demand for government securities. Both dummy variables are expected to have a significantly positive effect on MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt.
Banking sector asset allocation strategy and funding sources
One important driver of the demand for government securities could be the MFI asset allocation strategy. The strategy reflects the MFI risk aversion and the risk-return profile of the different investments. Among others, the evaluation of asset prices as well as the level of interest rates might have an impact on the strategy. Equity prices reflect the fundamental environment and the investors' expectations. We control for the growth rate of real property prices (RPP_Ch) and the growth rate of stock market prices (Equity_Ch). Moreover, we employ the historical volatility (Equity_Vola) of stock markets in the respective period. 4 We also control for the impact of long-term government bond yields (GG_LTYield) and credit assessment of domestic public sector. The latter is based on credit ratings provided by FitchRatings, Moody's, S&P, and DBRS that were converted to credit quality steps following the definition of CRR. Not only does credit assessment potentially affect the asset allocation strategy of credit institutions, it is also important for central bank funding of MFI. The Eurosystem provides credit on a collateralised basis. Until October 2008, the ECB only accepted securities with external ratings between AAA and A-(credit quality steps 1 and 2). As the consequence of rating deterioration following the crisis, it also accepts securities with external ratings between BBB+ and BBB-(credit quality step 3) from October 2008 on. Moreover, the ECB suspended the minimum credit rating threshold for Greece, Ireland and Portugal during the euro debt crisis. Dummy variables
CQS_1or2_Dummy (credit quality step 1 or 2) and CQS_3_Dummy (credit quality step 3) are used to control for the impact of sovereign credit ratings on MFI demand for marketable public debt.
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The asset allocation strategy affects the asset side of MFI. We also control for MFI funding sources. Buch et al. (2013) find that banks with weak capitalisation and banks with a small depositor base have higher sovereign debt exposure. Therefore, we also control for capital and reserves (MFI_CapRes) and retail deposits (MFI_Deposits). In addition, we control for total bank assets other than domestic marketable sovereign debt (MFI_TotAssets). We are using the flows. The variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP for the relevant period.
We expect the banks potentially shifting towards safer investments in periods of deteriorating equity and property prices. The demand for marketable sovereign debt should be negatively correlated with asset prices. Volatility is negatively correlated with equity price growth rates, and therefore, should be positively linked with the MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt.
The demand for government debt should be positively related with long-term government yields in case that MFI purchase these assets for generating interest income. On the other hand the yield might be less important if the demand is particularly driven by regulatory requirements or even explicit policy makers stimulation to purchase government debt. We believe that credit quality has little effect on the MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt. First, those MFI that apply the SA assign zero-risk weights for their domestic sovereign debt portfolio independent of the rating. Second, the ECB has suspended the minimum credit rating threshold and also accepts lower quality debt instruments as collateral. Therefore, sovereign credit ratings should have little impact on both CAR for SA banks and MFI access to ECB credit.
Policy makers' and public sector and intervention
The effect of Basel III is potentially distorted by various events taking place in the aftermath of the global financial meltdown and in the cause of the subsequent euro zone debt crisis. We need to control both for a post-Lehman and a post-euro-crisis bias. Over As the sample only includes euro zone member states, the key interest rate is the same for all countries in the sample. Therefore, we do not control for its effect separately.
The excessive central bank funding is expected to have a positive effect on the MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt. The potential effect of the SMP is unclear. The programme is expected to have a negative effect on MFI demand if banks have sold their holdings to the ECB. However, the effect could also be positive either because they might be forced to support the programme and keep their holdings or simply believed in the non-default of their domestic government following the intervention of the ECB and took a higher stake in domestic government bonds. The effect of public interventions is expected to be positive.
Results
This section presents our results and derives implications of impact of public debt treatment within the banking sector regulation on financial sector vulnerability. Tables   12-15 summarize the results of the estimations. We use random effects panel models for all estimations. 5
Impact of banking sector regulation on MFI demand for marketable sovereign debt
Tables 12 and 13 show our main results. First, we control for the net primary market supply in column (1). The coefficient of GGSec is positive and highly significant. In the next step, we introduce the Basel II and Basel III dummy variables. Both dummy variables suggest that bank regulation has a significant positive impact on MFI demand for domestic government securities. Adding both dummies yields a substantially higher R-Squared between the countries. Thus, we conclude the bank regulation helps explain variation across the individual euro member states. Further control variables are introduced in the subsequent specifications and examined one-by-one below.
In columns (3)-(5) of Table 12 we control for the impact of asset prices. Equity_Vola, Equity_Ch and RHPI_Ch have the expected signs. Equity markets volatility and property prices are highly significant. We control for risk and return characteristics of marketable sovereign debt in specifications (6) and (7). The results suggest a positive relationship between banks' demand for marketable sovereign debt and long-term government bond yields. Credit quality assessment is not significant.
Column (8) In specifications (10)-(12) of Table 13 we control for the effect of policy makers' (12). Notably, those member states that were targeted by the SMP had high long-term government bond yields. The government yields are not significant any more if we add them to specification (13). Although MFI demand for domestic government bonds was high in low-yield member states over the last years, the highest demand was observed in the SMP countries. The results imply that the MFI demand is not necessarily determined by attractive yields but was significantly influenced by the SMP.
Specifications (14)- (18) Except for asset relief, public sector interventions are not significant. Our earlier results remain robust if we add these intervention data into the regression. Interestingly, both Basel dummies are significant and robust in all specifications. They remain highly robust if we control for a post-Lehman and a post-euro-debt-crisis bias by adding public sector and policy makers' interventions as well as deteriorating asset prices. The following section examines the representativeness of our results for the overall euro area. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Representativeness for the overall euro area
The sample covers both core euro member states and those member states which have joined the monetary union later. Core members are widely recognized as mature economies and have highly developed financial markets, thus providing a relatively homogeneous sample. They account for 99% of both securities issued by general government and MFI assets in the euro zone. Therefore, core member states are highly representative of the overall monetary union. Moreover they yield an almost balanced panel. Those economies which have launched the euro later, are either classified as emerging markets (Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia) or are relatively small compared to the original members (Cyprus, Malta).
They have joined the euro significantly later than core member states and still have less developed financial markets compared to original member states. Therefore, those countries only add up limited observations but would change our panel to be significantly unbalanced.
In columns (19)- (21) of Table 14 we therefore exclude Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia and
Slovenia from the sample. The overall results remain robust.
In columns (22)- (24) (25)- (27) of Table 14 . 7 We assign constant weights to all sample countries. The weights are based on total outstanding MFI assets in the observation period (for those countries which have joined the euro after 1999, only for their membership period). Again, our main results remain robust. Therefore, we replace the net issue of general government securities (GGSec) by the net financial transactions of general government (GGNetLia) in specifications (28)- (30) of Table 15 . This variable reflects the flows of total financial assets and liabilities. Financial liabilities are not limited to securities but also contain alternative debt instruments.
Including financial assets allows eliminating the effect of increase and reduction in liquidity. The coefficient of GGNetLia is positive and highly significant. GGNetLia includes different financial instruments and provides a wider supply definition of net primary market supply with government debt than GGSec. Thus, the magnitude of its coefficient is lower than for GGSec.
Having both the overall net financial transactions of general government and the net issue of general government securities, we are able to separate the impact of government financial transactions going beyond their net issuance of securities. GGSec and the difference between GGNetLia and GGSec are highly correlated. Adding both variables to our model simultaneously creates multicollinearity. Therefore, we regress GGSec on GGNetLia first and then add the error term to our model in specifications (31) Our results remain highly robust and significant after controlling for potential endogeneity. The coefficients of Basel II and Basel III dummy variables remain positive and significant in all specifications. These findings alleviate our concerns of endogeneity, and particularly reverse causality. 
Summary and concluding remarks
The overall domestic marketable sovereign debt exposure of banks has significantly increased across euro member states during the last years. We employ country panel data and examine the demand of MFI for these instruments. We are particularly interested in the impact of banking sector regulation on the demand of MFI for marketable sovereign debt. These are our main findings:
• The demand is substantially driven by government net issue of securities.
• Both Basel II (i.e. impact of credit default probability on risk weights) and
Basel III (i.e. enhanced capital and new liquidity requirements) have a strong positive impact on MFI demand for domestic marketable sovereign debt.
• Banks shift their asset allocation towards domestic sovereign bonds when stock markets are volatile and asset prices deteriorate.
• Public sector and policy maker interventions, in particular the liquidity injections of ECB during the crisis as well as its interventions in bond markets under the Securities Market Programme, also have a positive impact on demand for domestic sovereign bonds.
• The results are representative of the overall euro area and remain robust if we control for potential endogeneity.
The primary goal of the Basel framework is to improve the capitalization of the MFI and to increase liquidity buffers. Existing bank regulation incentivises MFI to purchase more government debt for meeting the requirements. In some member states, social security funds hold substantial amounts of marketable central government debt instruments (i.e. intergovernmental lending). In Cyprus, Greece, Finland and Ireland, central government debt contribution exceeds the consolidated general government debt and yields a ratio above 100% for some observation periods. Std. Dev. 4.2 1.2 0.5 1.1 0.0 0.9 6.8 0.9 1.5 n.a. Std. Dev. 2.0 1.1 9.4 4.7 2.1 3.0 3.9 3.6 20.9 9.9 2.9 15.2 1.5 2.4 7.1 1.1 3.4 1.3
Min. 
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C. Claims of monetary financial institutions on public sector
The following tables build upon monetary statistics provided by the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB provides consolidated assets of monetary financial institutions (MFI) for each member state of the European Union (EU), including but not limited to claims on general government. The latter contain securities other than shares, loans and deposit liabilities. Securities other than shares are broken down by counterpart area to domestic and other euro area member states (no breakdown for loans, and therefore no breakdown for overall claims on public sector). The exposure to non-euro countries is not broken down at country level and is only available for the whole monetary union. For individual countries, the breakdown is only available at the general government level. Claims on public sector are not broken down by currency. The data is reported on monthly basis.
The tables provide descriptive statistics for the sample countries for the fifteen-year period between 1999 and 2013. The last column of each table reports the aggregated statistics for the overall euro zone. Std. Dev. 3.1 7.8 6.0 1.1 0.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 6.5 3.2 2.4 6.0 2.5 1.9 4.5 7.5 2.3 1.9
Min. The amount of total securities other than shares issued by the domestic general government is only available on quarterly basis (see Table 12 ). Therefore, this table summarizes quarterly statistics. In Portugal, the amount of domestic marketable sovereign debt holdings exceeds the overall amount of euro area sovereign debt holdings between 04/2000 and 08/2000. The issue has been addressed but was not explained by the ECB.
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